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PRINCE V. ST. FRANCIS-ST. GEORGE HOSPITAL, INC.
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis advocated legal recognition of the
right of privacy in their 1908 law review article, The Right of Privacy.' In
1905 Georgia became the first jurisdiction to recognize the invasion of the
right of privacy as an actionable tort.' In 1955 the Ohio Supreme Court
recognized invasion of privacy as actionable in Housh v. Peth.3 The Housh
court identified three means by which one's privacy could be invaded:
"An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted appro-
priation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's pri-
vate affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the
wrongful intrusion into one's activities in such a manner as to outrage or
cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sen-
sibilities.""
In Housh,5 the court acknowledged invasion of privacy through three distinct
means: appropriation of another's personality, publicizing another's private af-
fairs, and intruding into another's solitude. Decisions in Ohio since Housh
have refined the definition of the elements of the three branches of this tort.'
One issue which has not been explicitly ruled on by the Ohio Supreme
Court is whether negligence can be the basis of an action for the invasion of
privacy. Perhaps this is because the majority of invasion cases involve actions
which are obviously intentional and often malicious. The typical example in-
volves creditors harassing, threatening, and embarassing debtors.7 Other in-
stances include newspaper or television broadcasts of information on another
In such cases, the issue of negligence does not arise. In Prince v. St. Francis-St.
'This concept of the right to privacy refers to the right not to have personal information made known to the
general public. "The common law secures each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what ex-
tent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others." Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890). For discussion recommending limiting the privacy tort
see D. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis : Privacy Tort. 68
CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983).
'Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (involving unauthorized use of plain-
tiffs name and picture by defendant insurance company in advertisement).
'Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (Defendant creditor engaged in pattern of harass-
ment of plaintiff to collect debt; harassment included reported telephone calls to employer and to her home
late at night).
'Id.
5Id.
'See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
'Stevens v. Harmony Loan Corp., 37 Ohio App. 2d 23, 306 N.E.2d 163 (1973) (Creditor instituted legal pro-
ceedings on four occasions after plaintiff informed creditor that plaintiff was not debtor).
'Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), cert. granted.
429 U.S. 1037 (1977), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 1977), on remand 54 Ohio St. 2d 286, 376 N.E.2d 582 (1976)
(Defendant filmed and broadcasted on television plaintiffs entire act as a daredevil human cannonball con-
trary to his express wish; however, plaintiffs action failed in favor of defendant's first amendment right to
broadcast newsworthy material).
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George Hospital, Inc.,' the court of appeals for Hamilton County considered
whether negligence can be the basis of an actionable invasion of privacy. The
defendants argued that their acts were merely negligent and thus not ac-
tionable.' The court rejected this defense and held that a cause of action does
exist for negligent invasion of privacy."
This note considers the possible impact on Ohio law of the Prince holding.
A review of Ohio's prior position on invasion of privacy'2 suggests that the
holding of Prince represents a substantial departure from past decisions in two
respects: first, the plaintiffs alleged that their privacy was invaded when infor-
mation was communicated to only one other person, 3 and second, the invasion
of the privacy of one spouse served as the basis for a claim of the other
spouse." This apparent departure of Prince from prior decisions is discussed in
the context of a physician's duty of confidentiality and defendant's breach of
that confidence.
FACTS
Mrs. Prince underwent treatment for alcoholism at St. Francis-St. George
Hospital.' 5 She was admitted under the care of Dr. Newman and was cared for
by him and Dr. Scharold.' 6 Upon admission, she and her husband were given a
guarantee of privacy concerning medical information. Near the end of her
stay, without her knowledge or approval, Dr. Scharold sent a health insurance
claim form to Mr. Prince's place of employment, in care of a fellow employee
who was not authorized to receive such claim forms.'7 The form indicated that
Mrs. Prince was treated for acute and chronic alcoholism.' 8 Mr. Prince's co-
worker was the only person who was alleged to have seen the private medical
information.'" The Princes filed suit charging invasion of privacy. Mrs. Prince
alleged that she suffered extreme humiliation and she sought money damages.
Mr. Prince also alleged that he suffered extreme humiliation as well as lost
'Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp. Inc., 20 Ohio App. 3d 4, 484 N.E.2d, 265 (1985).
'"Id. at 6, 484 N.E.2d at 267.
"Id. at 7, 484 N.E.2d at 268. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
2See. e.g.. Jackson v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (reviews Ohio Supreme
Court position on right of privacy), see also notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
'
3See. e.g.. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comment a (1977), "Publicity, on the other hand,
means that the matter is made public by communicating it to the public at large or to so many persons that
the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."
"See. e.g.. Young v. That Was the Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio 1969), affd423 F.2d 265
(6th Cir. 1970), Iholding that the right to privacy is personal and can be asserted only by the one whose
privacy was invaded and not by family members).
"Prince. 20 Ohio App. 3d at 5, 484 N.E.2d at 266.
1-Id.
17Id.
"Id.
"Id. at 6, 484 N.E.2d at 267.
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employment opportunities as a result of the acts of the defendant. He also
sought money damages. The trial court granted a motion for summary judge-
ment for all defendants and the Princes appealed."
On appeal, defendant doctors argued that the plaintiffs had offered no
proof that the defendants had intentionally invaded Mrs. Prince's privacy.
Relying on McCormick v. Haley,2 defendants contended that the mere
negligent invasion of privacy is not actionable. Since they were merely
negligent in sending the claim to the wrong person, they were not liable for in-
vading Mrs. Prince's privacy."
The Prince court reviewed Ohio's position on invasion of privacy as ar-
ticulated in Housh v. Peth,"1 and concluded that Ohio permits an actionable in-
vasion of privacy based on the negligence of the defendant." The Prince court
reviewed the dicta of McCormick which stated that "A mere negligent intru-
sion into one's private activities does not constitute an actionable invasion of
the right of privacy."" The Prince court then held "McCormick v. Haley not-
withstanding, as we read the rule of Housh, it does not limit 'wrongful intru-
sion' to intentional intrusion; it seems to us the Housh rule allows for an ac-
tionable invasion of the right of privacy through negligence as well as intent."26
The court permitted Mrs. Prince's claims to proceed to trial.27
The court considered whether to allow Mr. Prince's claim. While the
court expressed its belief that the amount of damages which he sought might
be fanciful, the court permitted his cause of action.2" The court did not discuss
the basis of Mr. Prince's claim, nor is it clear from the record upon what basis
he was proceeding. The only mention of any cause of action in the opinion was
the statement concerning whether sending the letter to Mr. Prince's co-worker
invaded Mrs. Prince's privacy. 9 The court considered Mr. Prince's claim as a
correlated issue to the invasion of Mrs. Prince's privacy and permitted him to
2ud. at 5, 484 N.E.2d at 266 (Defendants included the hospital, a corporation which operated the detoxifica-
tion unit in the hospital, Dr. Neumann who admitted Mrs. Prince and Dr. Scharold, her attending physician;
the claim against the hospital was disallowed for lack of employer-employee relationship between the hos-
pital and the physicians who were characterized as independent contractors; while the corporation which op-
erated the unit was included as a defendant, the term defendant(s) will only refer to physician(s)).
"McCormick v. Haley, 37 Ohio App. 2d 73, 307 N.E.2d 34 (1973) (Defendant-physician on three occasions
mailed notice encouraging patient who had died to come in for check-up; family of deceased had initiated
malpractice suit against physician in death of patient; family claimed mailing of notices was malicious intru-
sion into privacy; court in dicta stated that negligent intrusion was not actionable and that plaintiff must
show physician intended to harrass family).
"Prince, 20 Ohio App. 3d at 6, 484 N.E.2d at 267..
"Housh, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340.
2 Prince, 20 Ohio App. 3d at 7, 484 N.E.2d at 268 (1985).
21Id. (quoting McCormick.)
261d.
271d.
uid. at 8, 484 N.E.2d at 269.
"Id. at 6, 484 N.E.2d at 268.
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proceed in an effort to prove damages. There was no discussion of the underly-
ing theory of his cause of action."
NEGLIGENT INVASION OF PRIVACY
The Prince court held that negligence may serve as the basis of actionable
invasion of privacy.' The McCormick court held that invasion of privacy must
be intentional, not merely negligent."
This apparent discrepancy between the opinions of the Prince court and
the McCormick court must be considered in light of the fact that invasion of
privacy is composed of three distinct forms in Ohio.3 One commentator has
stated that the failure to recognize that there are distinct forms of invasion of
privacy has resulted in much of the apparent confusion in decisions.
Since its recognition of the three forms of invasion of privacy in Housh,
the Ohio Supreme Court has expressly adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts position concerning two of the three forms of invasion: intrusion into
seclusion of another," and appropriation of another's liberties. 6 The Supreme
Court has not considered a case involving the third form of invasion: publiciz-
ing the private affairs of another. However, considering the Ohio Supreme
Court's reliance on the Restatement, it is probable that the Restatement's posi-
tion on invasion through publication of private affairs would also be adopted
by the court.3 Thus, the evaluation of the Prince holding must be considered
in light of Ohio's position concerning each of the three distinct forms of inva-
sion which are recognized.
-ld. at 8, 484 N.E.2d at 269.
"Id. at 7, 484 N.E.2d at 268.
"
2McCormick, 37 Ohio App. 2d at 78, 307 N.E.2d at 38.
31See, e.g.. Housh, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (definition of three bases for actionable invasion of
privacy).
4W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS 814 (4th ed. 1971). See also Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)
(Identifies four branches of invasion of privacy: first, intrusion into another's seclusion; second, public
disclosure of private facts; third, appropriation of another's likeness; fourth, publicity placing another in a
false light). For discussion of conflict between false light invasion and first amendment rights see Amen,
Tort Recovery for Invasion of Privacy, 59 NEB. L. REV. 808 (1980); Fisher, Renwick v. News and Observer
Publishing Co: North Carolina Rejects False Light Invasion of Privacy Tort, 63 N. CAR. L. REV. 767 (1985);
Annual Survey of Oklahoma Law, 6 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 33, 299 (1981).
3 Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St. 2d 143, 431 N.E.2d 992 (1982) (Defendant municipal employee observed plain-
tiffs dog kennel; defendant was acting in course of employment; under sovereign immunity doctrine, plain-
tiff is required to show defendant acted with malice to recover; court quoted Restatement (Second) position
on all four branches of invasion and used Restatement (Second) to consider elements of intrusion).
'Zacchini, 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454.
7See e.g. Jackson, 574 F. Supp. 10. Federal District Court here reviewed Ohio Supreme Court and. relying
on Sustin, concluded that Ohio has in fact adopted the Restatement (Second) position completely. But see
Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. 6 Ohio St. 3d
369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983). In Yeager the Court stated "Under the facts of instpnt case, we find no ra-
tionale which compels us to adopt the false light theory of recovery at this time." /o at 372, 453 N.E.2d at
670.
[Vol. 20:1
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The Restatement (Second) position on liability for the invasion of privacy
through appropriation of another's likeness occurs when one "appropriates to
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another." 8 It is difficult to imag-
ine a situation where one would negligently appropriate the name or likeness
of another. 9 Such actions in Ohio generally have involved use by media of
likeness or information concerning another without obtaining permission.'
Another type of invasion through appropriation involves the unauthorized use
of another's name or likeness to advertise a product. This type of appropriation
was alleged in Wilk v. Andrea Radio Corporation.' Here the defendant includ-
ed the names of the plaintiffs in advertisement without obtaining their permis-
sion. 2 It appears that invasions of privacy through appropriation of another's
likeness would be intentional and therefore not applicable to Prince.
The second basis for invasion of privacy is through "wrongful intrusion
into one's activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering or
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.""3 This definition,
given in Housh, does not specifically address the element of intent. The Prince
court read the definition to include a negligent intrusion." The McCormick
court limited such intrusions to those which were intentional."5
In Sustin v. Fee, Ohio adopted the Restatement (Second) position con-
cerning this type of invasion of privacy.41 The Restatement (Second) position is
that "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for the invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. '47 The Restatement (Second) expressly
requires that the intrusion be intentional. Thus, for the invasion of privacy by
intrusion, Ohio requires intent. The discussion of the McCormick court, that
the intrusion must be intentional, appears to be consistent with Ohio's posi-
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
"
9See Id. illustrations I through 6. All involve intentional appropriation by one of the name or likeness of
another, including impersonating another, using another's picture in an advertisement, signing another's
name to a document.
"°See Zacchini. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454.
' Wilk v. Andrea Radio Corporation, 200 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1960), modified 13 App. Div. 2d 745, 216 N.Y.S.2d
662 (1961).
41d. at 523. (Negligence was raised by defendant who stated he believed that he had plaintiffs permission to
use their names; the court rejected this defense; thus, while the appropriation was clearly intentional, the
defendant may have negligently failed to get permission; this type of negligence relates to a defense and not
to the initial intrusion by appropriation; thus, this type of negligence differs from that discussed in Prince.
where the initial intrusion may have been done negligently).
"Housh. 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340.
"Prince, 20 Ohio App. 3d at 7, 484 N.E.2d at 288.
"McCormick. 37 Ohio App. 2d at 78, 307 N.E.2d at 38.
4'Sustin. 69 Ohio St. 2d at 145, 431 N.E.2d at 993.
"RESIAITMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
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tion. 8 The Prince court's conclusion that a negligent intrusion may be ac-
tionable appears to differ from Ohio's current position."9
The final basis of invasion of privacy is by publicizing one's private affairs
with which the public has no legitimate concern."50 The Ohio Supreme Court
has not expressly adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) on this type
of invasion. However, the Restatement (Second) is a useful authority in light of
the court's reliance on the Restatement for defining the elements of the other
branches of invasion. The Restatement (Second) position is:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that:
a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."
Neither the definition of the Housh" court nor the position of the Restatement
(Second)" requires that the publication be intentional. The elements expressly
stated in both Housh" and the Restatement (Second)" are:
1) that there be publicity,
2) that the matter be private, and
3) that the public have no legitimate concern about the information.
The Restatement (Second) includes a further requirement: that a reasonable
person would be highly offended by the publication.5 6
This is the type of invasion of privacy which the plaintiff alleged in
Prince. " The Prince58 court held that the defendant may be liable even if he
acted negligently. This holding appears to be consistent with the Ohio position
articulated in Housh,59 as well as with the position of the Restatement
(Second).6
In summary, the holding of Prince, that negligence can serve as the basis
of an action for an invasion of privacy, is consistent with Ohio's position of in-
"McCormick, 37 Ohio App. 2d at 78, 307 N.E.2d at 38.
' Prince, 20 Ohio App. 3d at 7, 484 N.E.2d at 268.
"Housh, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340.
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
sHoush, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340.
"See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
-"Housh, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340.
"See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
'*RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
"Prince, 20 Ohio App. 3d at 5, 484 N.E.2d at 267.
111d. at 8, 484 N.E.2d at 269.
"Housh, 165 Ohio St. at 41, 133 N.E.2d at 344.
'See, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
"'Prince, 20 Ohio App. 3d at 8, 484 N.E.2d at 269.
[Vol. 20:1
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vasion through publication. However, the court's holding in Prince appears
to be inconsistent with Ohio's position on invasion through intrusion into the
seclusion of another or through appropriation of another's likeness.63 Prince
appears to be limited to the type of invasion which was alleged by the plain-
tiffs; the publication of private information.
PUBLICATION RESULTING FROM BREACH OF CONFIDENCE
In Prince it was alleged that the private information was communicated
to only one other person.6" Without discussion of this issue, the court agreed
with the plaintiffs' claim for the invasion of the right of privacy." The Ohio
Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the definition of publication.
However, the position of Prince,66 permitting an action when the publication is
to only one other, is inconsistent with the position of the Restatement
(Second): "Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule
stated in this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private
life to a single person or even to a small group of persons. '"67
The Ohio Supreme Court has neither expressly adopted the Restatement
(Second)68 position nor has the court expressly ruled on the definition of
publication. No Ohio court has considered whether the publication require-
ment is met when information is revealed to only one or a small number of in-
dividuals. Decisions from other jurisdictions have been based on the Restate-
ment (Second) position that the publication must be made to many persons or
available to the public at large.69 The discrepancy between the position of the
court in Prince and that of the Restatement (Second) is substantial. The
holding of the Prince court, if applied literally, would appear to include
disclosures made in private conversations. It is unlikely that this was the intent
of the Prince court. Rather, the facts suggest that the reinterpretation of the
2ld.
"Housh, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340. See also RESTATEMENT. supra note 51 and accompanying text.
*Prince. 20 Ohio App. 3d at 5, 484 N.E. 2d at 266.
'The court stated:
The threshold issue as presented by this appeal is whether the sending of the bill with the medical
diagnosis prominently indicated in connection therewith by Dr. Scharold to the office of the
husband's employer was publication of personal information without permission so that it violated
the wife's right to privacy.
The court acknowledged Mr. Prince's co-worker's affidavit in which he admitted he opened and read the bill.
The court then concluded that this presented an issue of fact whether he read the diagnosis and whether the
summary judgment of the trial court was improper. Thus the court assumed that if the co-worker read the
diagnosis this would constitute publication. Prince. 20 Ohio App. 3d at 6, 484 N.E.2d at 267.
old. at 484 N.E.2d at 268.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
"id.
""See e.g. Peterson v. Idaho-First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P. 2d 284 (1961) (court rejected invasion of
privacy, failure of plaintiff to allege publicity of information). Compare Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80,
257 N.W. 2d 522 (1977) (Employer sent letter to Army Reserve concerning employee; even though a small
group of people saw the letter, this relatively small group may be adequate to meet publicity requirement).
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publication requirement occurred because the defendants were physicians. All
physicians assume a duty for treating information concerning their patients
with confidentiality.7" Mrs. Prince's physician breached his duty of confiden-
tiality by divulging this information to another.7
Thus, the Prince2 holding can be seen as permitting a cause of action
when a physician breaches his duty of confidentiality even when the act does
not completely meet the traditional requirements of invasion of privacy. Here,
the publication was only to one other individual. This appears to be an exten-
sion of Ohio's current position. Courts in two other jurisdictions have express-
ly acknowledged breach of confidence as an actionable tort.73 There is some
support in prior Ohio decisions for a distinct tort based on a physician's breach
of confidence. In Hammonds v. Aetna," an insurance company induced a
physician to breach his duty of confidentiality to a patient." The company
falsely told the physician that the patient was about to file a malpractice suit
against him.76 This led the physician to terminate his services to the patient and
to provide the company with confidential information concerning the patient."
The patient sued the company. The company defended by arguing that physi-
cians have no legal duty to maintain confidentiality.78 The court presented the
policy reasons for the physician's duty of confidentiality and concluded:
"We are of the opinion that the preservation of the patient's privacy is no
mere ethical duty upon the part of the doctor; there is a legal duty as well.
The unauthorized revelations of medical secrets, or any confidential com-
munication given in the course of treatment, is tortious conduct which
may be the basis for an action in damages."7 9
In Knecht v. Yandalis Medical Center, Inc., 1 Plaintiff sued a non-professional
"'All state medical societies have an ethical standard concerning maintaining confidentiality. See Rights to
Prii'acy' in Medical Records. 3 J. OF LEG. MD. 30 (July/Aug. 19751 (review of ethical and legal obligations
of physicians to maintain confidentiality: quoting PRINCIPItES OF Mt-tnCAt ETHICS OF THI AMERICAN
MIt)IAt. Assm tArION 9 1957):
"A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance, or
the deficiencies he may observe in the character of his patients, unless he is required to do so by law or
unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or the community."
"Prince. 20 Ohio App. 3, at 5, 484 N.E.2d at 267.
'd. at 8, 484 N.E.2d at 269.
"See e.g. MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 11982) (Defendant physician breached
confidence of patient; court held that the patient-doctor relation includes an additional duty of confidence
and if the duty is breached it is actionable). See also Horney v. Patten, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973)
(Physician disclosed confidential information to patient's employer: court states that action could be based
on breach of confidence). For general discussion of topic of tort of breach of confidence see Note, Breach of
Confidence: An Emerging Tort. 82 CotUM. L. REv. 1426 119821.
"Hammonds v. Aetna. 243 F. Supp. 793 IN.D. Ohio 1965).
"d. at 795.
'-Id
7 7Id
"Id. at 795-96.
'lid. at 801-802.
"Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Center, Inc.. 14 Ohio App. 3d 129, 470 N.E.2d 230 11984).
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employee in a medical center. Defendant disclosed information concerning
plaintiffs medical treatment.' In considering plaintiffs appeal from a sum-
mary judgment, the court reviewed plaintiffs claim that any wrongful
divulgence of medical information is actionable in Ohio. 2 The court cited
Hammonds3 but concluded that since a non-professional divulged the infor-
mation, the breach of confidence issue was not relevant.8 4
As the courts in both Hammonds and Knecht note, Ohio provides
statutory support for an action against a physician for breach of confidentiali-
ty. R.C. 2317.0285 defines the scope of the physician-patient privilege in testify-
ing, and R.C. 4731.226 provides for disciplinary action against a physician
who breaches his duty of confidentiality.
Whether the Prince7 holding will create acceptance for invasion of the
right of privacy through breach of medical confidence remains to be seen. A
number of factors argue for acceptance of this extension. There is some sup-
port in cases from other jurisdictions.8 As noted in Hammonds, public policy
encourages maintaining medical confidentiality. Additionally, a disclosure to
only one other person is often most personally damaging especially if it is made
to one's employer or spouse. 9 Finally, the public's loss of faith in medical confi-
dentiality runs counter to the need for uninhibited disclosure by patient to phy-
sician. These factors suggest that other courts should consider adopting the
position of Prince9 that breach of confidence by a physician, even if the infor-
"Id. at 130, 470 N.E. 2d at 231.
21d. at 130-31, 470 N.E.2d at 232.
11243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio, 1965).
"Knecht. 14 Ohio App. 3d at 131, 470 N.E.2d at 232 (Here the court reviewed the statute defining physi-
cian's testimony privilege and the statute which establishes the basis for disciplinary action against physi-
cian, and held that these do not apply to non-professional employees such as the defendant: thus, no duty of
confidence existed between plaintiff and defendant; in this case. the court held on different grounds for
defendant, that she was privileged to reveal information to protect health of third party).
'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 B (Page 1984).
*OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22 B (Page 1984).
"
7Prince. 20 Ohio App. 3d at 8, 484 N.E.2d at 269.
.See. e.g.. MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 11982): see also Horne v. Patton. 291
Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (Both holding breach of confidence by physician as actionable tort).
"For discussion of this topic see Note, Breach of Confidences: An Emerging Tort, 82 Col.tJM. L. REV. 1426
(1982). See also Right to Privacy in Medical Records, J. OF L. ME). 30 (July/Aug. 1975). But see RES TA TI
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a f1977): Annot., 20 ALR 3d 1109 11968): Wachsman, Hear
All. See All. But Silence May Be Golden: Confidentiality. Privacy and Privileged Communication. 13 Lt-;,t
Asp. oF MED. PRAC.. February 1985 at 5. Both reviews discuss the possible bases for actionable breach of
confidence which courts has recognized. These include invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and breach
of fiduciary relationship. See also Firestone, Sh! Patient Confidentiality in a Lawsuit: Physician Privilege
and a Lawsuit. 13 LEGAL ASP. OF MED. PRAC.. February. 1985 at I. which reviews the increasing liability
for physicians in actions based on breach of confidence. For further discussion of common law protections
of medical records see Note, Privacs' Rights in Medical Records, 13 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 165, 175-181
11985).
'See also Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort. 82 CoLuNl. L. R-v. 1426, 143911982) for extend-
ed discussion of different interests protected by invasion of privacy and breach of confidence. Confidentiali-
ty protects one's interests in I the expectation of confidentiality arising from the assurance of secrecy and
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mation is communicated to only one other person, is actionable as invasion of
privacy.
THE PERSONAL NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The Prince court permitted an action by the husband of the woman
whose privacy was invaded. His claim for damages included mental suffering
and lost wages resulting from lost opportunities at work. The court's only
discussion of his claim concerned the amount sought. The court did not ad-
dress the issue of whether his privacy was invaded. This would seem to be an
important issue since this case appears to be the only Ohio case to permit an ac-
tion by one other than the person whose privacy was invaded.9
In Young v. That Was the Week That Was92 the court held that the chil-
dren could not assert that their privacy was invaded when a television program
made statements concerning their mother. The court stated that the right of
privacy is personal and can only be asserted by the one who's privacy was in-
vaded.93 The Restatement (Second)9" is also clear in identifying the right as per-
sonal.
In Prince it is not clear how Mr. Prince's right of privacy was invaded. A
departure from current authority exists if the rule in Prince permits Mr. Prince
an action based on invasion of his wife's privacy. Alternatively, the court may
have concluded that Mr. Prince's privacy was invaded by the communication
of his wife's diagnosis to a co-worker. It is not clear whether the court conclud-
ed that Mr. Prince had a cause of action based on the invasion of his wife's pri-
vacy or whether his own privacy was invaded. Regardless of which position
the court may have adopted, it is not likely that this holding will have an im-
pact outside of the facts of this case. The well settled rule is that an action for
invasion privacy is personal. The interest protected is one's reputation, a per-
sonal interest. There appears to be no compelling reason to extend this person-
al right to permit an action by anyone other than the one whose privacy is in-
vaded.
CONCLUSION
The Prince court held that an invasion of privacy through the negligence
of another is actionable.95 This holding is consistent with the Ohio Supreme
one's reliance thereon and 2) freedom from circulation of damaging information. The invasion of privacy, as
defined in the Restatement (Second), does not protect the first of the confidentiality interest and protects the
second only if the circulation of the information is to the public at large.
'The only Ohio case discussing this issue is Young. 312 F. Supp. 1337. Compare 35 0. JUR. 3d Defamation
and Privacy § 160 (1982) (Discussion of rights of third person to assert invasion of privacy if defendant
maliciously invades another's privacy for the purpose of injuring third party's business or trade).
'Young, 312 F. Supp. at 1341.
"Id.
"Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6521 (1977).
"Prince. 20 Ohio App. 30 at 8, 484 N.E. 2d at 269.
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Court's position on the invasion of privacy by publication of private facts. It is
inconsistent with Ohio's position on other forms of invasion of privacy which
requires intentional conduct.
Prince also held actionable an invasion of privacy where the defendant
publicized private information concerning plaintiff to only one other person.'
This appears to be a departure from the position of the Restatement (Second)
which requires that the communication be made to a group of individuals or to
the public at large.97 However, it is more likely that this decision is meant to be
limited to the situation presented; a breach of confidentiality by a physician.
Whether future decisions will explicitly recognize this right of action is not
clear, but strong public policy arguments support such a right.
Finally, Prince permitted a husband to assert a claim based on the inva-
sion of his wife's privacy. It is unclear whether the Prince court expanded the
right to privacy action to include all persons injured by the invasion, or if Mr.
Prince's privacy was also invaded.
MICHAEL CHRISTIE
%Id.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
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